Category Archives: Comparative media research

What’s in it for me (as a member of the public)? A ‘public test’ for AI in news

I gave the closing talk at the Nordic AI in Media Summit 2026 May 27 – 28th Copenhagen, Denmark. It is an incredible event, and it was a privilege to be part of it. A video of my talk is here. The audio is a bit uneven, so below a transcript, lightly edited for clarity and with a few links to sources added.

What’s in it for me (as a member of the public)? A ‘public test’ for AI in news

Thank you very much for this opportunity to be here and learn from all of you, and also to speak today. So what I want to do today is to make a very Freudian move: ‘Enough about you, let’s talk about me.’

I want to do that in an assuming role, if you will, as an individual member of the public.

I’ll do it on the basis of research that I’ve had the privilege of doing together with Felix Simon, who you saw on the panel before, and Richard Fletcher from the Reuters Institute at the University of Oxford.

Anything in this presentation that’s good is to the credit of Richard and Felix. And then I will go beyond that research and try to interpret what I think this might mean as we move forward, and anything in that interpretation that you think is shoddy, guesswork, or anything like that, is entirely my responsibility.

Where I want to start, as said, is with a point also made on the panel before. It is the recognition that the value of any kind of news – tech enabled or not, more or less tech enabled – is in large part in the eye of the beholder. It’s a relationship between what you do – the content and service you provide – and then people like me, members of the public.

That point is important for our discussions here today because it means that realizing the full potential of AI in media is only in part about how you all judge it, and at least as much about how all of us as members of the public and what we make of that.

We know that this relation is essential, irreducibly important. How it will evolve in a changing ecosystem, we don’t know, but I will say that my hypothesis is different from the provocation that Felix offered before. I think that trust will grow more important as a differentiator.

So content may be commoditized, but I don’t believe that connections will be commoditized. But this is a hypothesis at this stage.

The way I want to evolve these ideas or offer them up for your considerations to sort of say, okay, we have heard from and now we will turn to us, the public.

Public perception of AI use and AI implications across sectors

So how do we do that? I’ll share some slides here based on survey research I did with Felix and Richard. This is based on representative samples of internet users in a range of countries across the world. I’m happy to share the details. The point here is not the details. I’m happy to discuss methods, but the presentation is not about methods. So bear with me when I go through this quite quickly to set up the interpretation that I hope will be generative for you, in an intellectual sense, as you think about how to do your job when you return to your day job tomorrow morning.

The first thing I think we can say confidently now after two years of doing this kind of survey research is that people tend to think that AI generated news and AI assisted news will be less trustworthy and cheaper for you to make.

So good for your proprietors, not so good for me as a member of the public.

We also know, I think now, after two years of doing this research, that people tend to assume that news media already use AI quite a lot.

So large shares of respondents in the survey when we were in the field last year said that they believe news media use AI often or always in their work. I think third only after search engines and social media companies.

Now in this room, yes, there are lots of video organizations we’ve seen who have really have integrated AI elements in many steps of the workflow and used them continuously.

But we can also step outside of this room and recognize that may not be the case in industry as a whole. Perhaps there is an assumed use of AI that in fact exceeds the actual role of AI in the industry as a whole.

So people seem to assume that the industry uses AI quite a lot.

But when we ask them what they think it will mean for their experience of news, a plurality believe that the use of AI in the news industry will make news worse for them.

Using these two data points – on assumed use and expectations, what it will mean for each of us individually as members of the public – we can create a chart like this, where we have on one axis, the assumed scale of use of AI in a particular sector of society, and the other one, the share of the public who believe that AI use will make their experience of engaging with the sector better.

Thus there are some sectors, politicians and political parties, for example, where people don’t really think they’re using AI or that much and also have pretty dim expectations about what it might mean to them.

There are sectors like science, where I happen to work myself, where people don’t think science is used to stuff all that much yet, but they have pretty high expectations what it might mean for their engagement with science.

Then you have news media high assumed use, pretty skeptical assumptions about what it would mean for us as members of the public.

And in the top right quadrant social media companies and the unnamed dot up there are search engine companies where people assume – probably rightly – that these tools are used extensively and also are more optimistic about what it means for us as members of the public than they are when it comes to your work as news organizations.

Interpreting public skepticism of AI use in news media

Why? Why do so many have such a skeptical view of your use of AI in the news media?

Often while simultaneously having more trust in and higher expectations for other sectors’ use of AI, including sectors that many of us and many of you, I think, have a sort of grounded skepticism of.

Here I necessarily need to move beyond the data and start to interpret it, but I will offer I think at least one thing that we can consider one potential heuristic or input into people’s interpretation of this, which is as an industry and as a profession, we are pretty good at drawing attention to it when we fuck up.

Just using only examples of organizations I personally respect and who have fessed up and stood up and sort of taken on the chin when there’s been something – so I use these as examples of what I think is a courage in time of uncertainty not to put anyone on the spot – here at Politiken last year the newspaper published a fact box that turned out to be curiously void of facts generated by, according to the paper, essentially a user error in terms of how an internal tool was deployed. There was a taking responsibility for it.

Another upmarket, generally a highly trusted title, also here in Denmark, then a little while later ran a long op-ed piece by a political party’s leadership. It turned out to contain multiple entirely fabricated supposed quotations attributed to rival politicians. This had not been discovered, neither by the political party nor by the publisher. Again, they stood up and took it on the chin and apologized.

We have my dear friend Melissa Bell from Chicago Public Media. The Chicago Sun-Times, published a AI-generated book list that involved imaginary titles. Melissa stood up and took responsibility and tried to explain how to move forward from that.

And also, of course, the New York Times has had a recent brush with this earlier this month, where an article turned out to contain a remark that was attributed to the leader of the opposition in Canada, but turned out it was an AI-generated summary of his views about Canadian politics that had been presented as a quotation to the journalist in question.

Again, I’m not putting people on the spot. I’m just saying, you know, we have these moments that really are not our best selves, and responsible organizations step up and admit it and explain it, and try to move past it.

And if they don’t, we’re lucky that the answer to the old question from Plato of ‘who guards the guardians’ is that the Guardian guards the guardians.

So if you don’t step up, you can be sure the Guardian will be ever vigilant.

So we have plenty of justified, negative, and fairly high profile attention that we draw to our industry and our professions own uses of AI.

Unlike the technology industry which tends to be conspicuously using AI, relentlessly optimistic about what it will mean for me as an end user, and the rest is sort of hidden in the corners or left to the Guardian and a few others to draw attention to.

It’s a very different way for different industries or professions to talk about how they’re rolling this out and what it might mean for me.

The old journalistic adage that we don’t cover the planes that land also seems to apply to our own profession and own industry’s use of AI.

We don’t talk very much about what’s working, we talk an awful lot about both our own failures and our peers’ failures.

And we do this in a context where people assume we’re using these tools and don’t think they’re going to be in their benefit, even though it may make it cheaper to produce content.

Four possible responses to public skepticism to AI use in news media

So how do we move on from here?

That’s your problem, not mine.

But I think research can at least offer an interpretation of different possible responses.

So I’ll do some stylized possible responses to this context that I think you’re operating when it comes to the public’s relationship to you and your use of AI and different tools.

I’ll map them out on two stylized axes. These are ideal types. Of course, nothing would ever be so clean and neat as this, but hopefully still useful to think about it.

One axis is essentially whether you are less of a user or more of a user, whether you plan to increase your use or perhaps in some cases constrain or even reduce your use of AI, which there are some companies who are saying that they will do, including in other sectors.

And the other axis is whether you are explicit about telling a story about how you’re using AI and really leaning into publicizing and communicating that story, or whether you’re using the tools implicitly and accepting that as a consequence, people will interpret that, what this might mean for their relationship with your journalism on the basis of other signals than what you provide them.

So with this, I think we can sort of name them.

One, I have called sort of ‘resigned journalism’, which is, I’m sorry it’s a bit of a negative phrase, but I couldn’t really think of a better way of putting, essentially what is saying, well, we’re going to continue to do what we’ve been doing since essentially the 19th century, if I can be a bit blunt, and we’re just going to hope that it works, and we’re not really going to make a fuss and a hue and a cry about how we do it that way. We’ll just carry on with this as usual and hope that that gets us we’re not going to lean into the tools and we’re not going to tell any exciting stories about this. I don’t think anyone see themselves in this, but i think this is the reality of some organizations, at least from the outside I think we can describe them this way perhaps uncharitable, but nonetheless.

Then we have what we might think of as ‘furtive AI journalism’ where you’re leaning into the tools you’re using them more and more you’re integrating them in particular back end and lots and lots of different things. But you’re not telling anyone about it, other than maybe a little sort of greyed out AI summary little note here and there.

And yes, if you click enough, perhaps you’ll find something somewhere on the website where you have your principles for use of AI, but there’s no explicit proactive effort to communicate how and why you are using AI more and more in your organization.

Then you have what we might think of as ‘romantic journalism’. This of course was the manifesto launched in Perugia, for those of you who were there at the International Journalism Festival by Lea Korsgaard from Zetland here in Denmark and Josh Herman from Mill Media in the UK, which is a nuanced view. So I don’t want to sort of suggest that it’s in any way opposed to technology, but I do think it’s a view that regards AI in journalism as something that needs to be carefully contained and primarily used for back-end things and is extremely explicit about positioning themselves as such. If you write a manifesto, you have an explicit communication strategy, let’s put it like that. And you’re also very conscious of drawing a contrast between you and your competitive set – the other publishers – who may be less romantic than what this perspective or response looks like.

And then we have a fourth one, which is why I think it was about ‘modernist journalism’.

So if the romantics believe that there are timeless things that we are at risk of losing touch with and we need to make a conscious choice to reconnect with those timeless values and see technology primarily as something that underpins those timeless values.

The modernist view would be – as is modernism in some forms of architecture, art, and literature – would be the view that our best selves are in the future and they are enabled by technology.

I think that people who come to an event like this are probably primarily drawn to this.

But I would also put to you that – while we talk about it here, and there are sort of various ‘how do we use AI’, you know, items on websites and Perugia talks and other things – the people who aspire to some sort of modernist vision of AI-enhanced journalism are perhaps not telling the story of it, or at least not cutting through the story of it to the same extent as some of the other voices in the industry and the profession, let alone in public life.

Because this is the forum that it is, without discounting the potential of romantic journalism, or without judging anyone for other responses that may be dictated by circumstances that are less benign or privileged, shall we say, than some of the people in the room here – because of the context that we’re in, I think it’s probably the modernist view that’s most interesting to sort of do a little bit more on before I wrap up.

How might one think about earning trust in AI use in news media?

So if one were to aspire to be a modernist journalist, and if one did believe that our best selves are ahead of us and are enhanced by technology, enabled by technology, but also recognize that trust is going to be central in realizing the full value of this, and connections and credibility are an incredibly important part of managing to connect with people in an ever more competitive media environment.

Then, if you want to use AI, and want to earn, maintain, and perhaps deepen public confidence in how you use that AI as part of your journalism, as part of your editorial operation, as part of your business, your distribution, we can go back to research we already have that speaks to how one builds trust.

This chart is drawing on earlier research led by Benjamin Toff – that also involved a team of colleagues – it’s just a sort of a slide to remind us when we talked in that research to journalists about what matters for public trust in news and then talk to members of the public in different countries, people in different backgrounds, different communities.

Yes, there is some overlap. It is a Venn diagram sort of thing to come up in both types of conversations. But also significant differences. And if you are particularly interested in the question of public trust in journalism, professional trust in one another is also important, but public trust in journalism, I think it’s really important to recognize that a lot of the things that citizens talk about when they talk about what from their point of view in general, trust in journalism or news, it’s not necessarily the same as the things that are top of mind from the point of view of journalists.

For example, journalists talk a lot about transparency.

Very rarely does that come up in interviews and focus groups, where people talk much more about, am I familiar with this brand? They talk about relevance, is it something that demonstrably help me in my everyday life? They talk about bias and impartiality, which often is community founded, more than ideologically founded, which you remember, most people do not think of politics in left-right terms, they think more of us and them. So it’s more about, is this a title that is aligned with or at least open to me and people like me – my experiences my view of the world do they respect represent and reflect the community that I am part of. That’s very easy for people like me to say ‘yes’ to because people like me have both made the news spin in the news and enjoyed the news for a long time. But a lot of people don’t have that privilege.

These are things that have little if anything to do with technology. But they are things we know from research can help engender trust. So maybe these are also important parts of your journey with AI, if you want to deploy it in a way that is not furtive, but modernist. Explicit about how you think this benefits not only you, but also me and other citizens.

The ‘public test’ for AI news – what’s in it for us?

So I will end simply with this – it is so good that we are all able to be here. As many have said before now, I’ll say it again. We owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the organizers and instigators of this gathering in addition to all of you giving one another the gift of your time and your expertise and conversations.

It remains really important that a professional community of practice continues to judge one another’s work and set standards for one another. And Kasper has given us one example of that. The ‘pøsevogn-test’, right, whether these tools can sort of capture, reproduce and create cultural specificities of language, of representation, of the like.

I mean, there are many ways of doing this. We have standards in the community, and that’s important. There’s nothing that I want to take away from that.

But equally important, perhaps even more important, I would say, at least for the next stage of the journey, I think, are the rest of us, right? Not just you, but also me and millions more like me.

Because it’s only one leg, the professional judgement of trust, of what value and trust looks like – and probably not the most important one, honestly.

So I would suggest as a compliment to ‘pølsevogns-testen’ the ‘public test’ for AI news.

As you move forward with your work in this, you are all very well positioned and in a community of practice that can help you judge what’s in AI news for you.

But you need to convince me and a multitude of other members of the public of what’s in it for us.

So I don’t have a sticker to give you. But if I had a sticker to give you, it would be this.

And I would encourage you to keep it at hand as you think about how you develop and deploy AI in news, if you want to.

Thank you very much.

2026 Digital News Report out

The data and analysis published in the 2026 Digital News Report, lead author Jim Egan writes, points to “greater volatility, reflecting this heightened sense of uncertainty. We see a range of responses: anxiety, disengagement, and cynicism, but also openness to new sources and formats, and continued belief in what news at its best can offer.”

For the first time this year, social media and video networks are, on average across the markets covered, more popular than both TV and owned news websites and apps as sources of news.

In parallel, the formats that platforms prioritize and users engage with are growing in importance – for the first time, a majority of people now watch online news video in all 48 Digital News Report markets, and in 45 markets more people now watch online news video than watch broadcast TV news. This growth in online video consumption is all happening on third party platforms. Mainstream news organisations have on average seen video consumption on their own sites and apps go backwards, down 5pp this year.

The news – broadly defined, and necessarily in the eye of the beholder – that people get via platforms is from many different sources, including often, but far from always, news media organizations. Around a quarter (27%) of respondents globally get some news from news-focused individual creators or influencers, and almost half (46%) get some news from creators of any type. This, importantly, does not necessarily happen at the expense of news media organizations. In fact, those who access creators consume more traditional media than the average respondent.

All this, and much, much, more, in the full report, by lead author Jim Egan, Craig T. Robertson, Amy Ross Arguedas, Nic Newman, myself, Mitali Mukherjee, and Richard Fletcher.

3 key findings from new report on generative AI use

How do people think different sectors’ use of generative AI will change their experience of interacting with them?

That’s one of the question we fielded in a new survey, and one of the three key findings from my perspective – looking across the six countries covered, there are more optimists than pessimists for e.g. science and healthcare, and for search engines and social media, but more pessimists than optimists for news media, the national government, and – especially – politicians and political parties.

Elsewhere in the survey, we ask whether people trust different generative AI offers – the picture is very differentiated, with net positive trust scores for e.g. ChatGPT, Google Gemini, and Microsoft Copilot, but negatives for those that are seen as part of various social media companies.

Finally, as search engines increasingly integrate AI generated answers, and more and more of us see these all the time, we asked about trust in these answers – the trust scores are high across the board, with higher net positives than any of the standalone tools. (With this and the question above, surveys do not measure whether the entities in question are trustworthy, and do not tell us anything about whether people should trust them, they provide data on whether they do trust them.)

Beyond that, the report, which I wrote with Felix Simon and Richard Fletcher, and which is published by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, is chock full of fresh data on generative AI use (basically doubled since last year), what people use these tools for (increasingly for information, presenting a very clear direct competition to search engines), and what they don’t (yet) use them for all that much (getting the latest news).

2025 Digital News Report out

“Alternative media voices often have a wide reach and appeal to audiences that news publishers have been keen to engage with but the report also shows that, when it comes to underlying sources of false or misleading information, online influencers and personalities are seen as the biggest threat worldwide along with national politicians”, Mitali Mukherjee writes in her introduction to the 2025 Digital News Report.

There are countries where news media still have a strong connection with much of the public, and where publishers have adapted well to a challenging digital media environment (including my native Denmark), but overall the report is a sobering read for the news media. As lead author Nic Newman writes: “In most countries we find traditional news media struggling to connect with much of the public, with declining engagement, low trust, and stagnating digital subscriptions.”

In the report, we document how platforms are increasingly central to how many find and access all sorts of content, including news, as well as a continued fragmentation of the platform space. There are now six networks with weekly news reach of 10% or more compared with just two a decade ago. Instagram, WhatApp, and TikTok in particular have grown in importance, whereas BlueSky still only has tiny reach amount our respondents.

While industry data suggests X is much diminished in terms of how intensely it is used, survey data on weekly use – perhaps surprisingly – suggests stable reach overall. A liberal exodus seems to have been matched by a growing number of right-wing users, and after many years of having a predominantly left-wing user base, X now has slightly more right-wing users.

In this increasingly distributed and platform-dominated environment, large parts of the public continue to be concerned about what is real and what is fake when it comes to online news – when asked what they are most concerned about, domestic politicians and online influencers/personalities top the list, in terms of platforms, concern is focused on Facebook and TikTok.

First Elon Musk and later Mark Zuckerberg has said they want to reduce how much content is subject to moderation on their platforms – while some political actors may applaud this, it is not clear the public does. A plurality in many countries say they want more harmful or offensive content removed from social media.

Finally, as generative AI is increasingly widely used, integrated into platforms, and adopted by many news publishers, we asked respondents what they think this will mean for news content – while there is some optimism AI-powered news will be more up to date and easier to understand, the topline is people expect it to be cheaper to make but less trustworthy.

All that and more in the 2025 Digital News Report, with topical chapters, country pages, interactive data, and more on the Reuters Institute website – an incredible team effort that I am proud to be part of.

2024 Digital News Report out

The 2024 Reuters Institute Digital News Report is out, documenting scale and scope of ‘platform resets’ and much more. It is a team effort by lead author Nic Newman, Richard Fletcher, Craig Robertson, Amy Ross, and myself, working with our country partners. The report covers 47 market accounting for more than half of the world’s population, and is made possible by our 19 funders. A real pleasure to chair the panel discussion at the global launch at Reuters News this morning, featuring Rozina Breen (editor-in-chief, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism), Anna Bateson (CEO of the Guardian Media Group), Rachel Corp (CEO of ITN), and Matthew Keen (Head of Operations and Strategy, Reuters).

A key theme this year is how a series of ‘platform resets’ are shaping how people access news and changing the environment publishers operate in – even as the percentage who say they get news via Facebook continues to decline, a range of other social, video, and messaging platforms are growing in importance for discovery, many focused on on-site video, visuals, and more private experiences.

Generally, many of our respondents say they find it at least somewhat easy to tell trustworthy and untrustworthy news and information apart on various platforms, but there are real differences, with more people concerned about how to navigate information on e.g. TikTok, X, Facebook.

We also document the continually fraying connection between much of the public and much of the news media industry. In many markets, trust is limited, interest in news declining, and news avoidance growing. Many of our respondents say they are worn out by the amount of news, up sharply since we last asked this question in 2019.

We know many publishers care deeply about trust in news, and in a more challenging media environment where much of the public, in many cases especially less privileged people, do not trust the news, publishers able to earn and maintain trust may be able to stand out.

In terms of what factors are important when deciding which news outlets to trust, we show that while people come to different conclusions RE individual brands, across the political spectrum from left to right, most actually emphasize the same factors. The main difference here is not by political orientation but what political scientists call “the other divide” – the large group of people who are more distant from conventional politics (and often less privileged in terms of income and education) are less sure what, if anything, would lead them to trust a news outlet.

That and much more in the full report, which is freely available here.

2022 Digital News Report out

2022 Digital News Report out now. A huge effort by an amazing team that I’m proud to be part of.

We cover 46 markets on six continents, accounting for more than half of the world’s population.

The full report is available here in HTML and here as a PDF.

We are using the hashtag #DNR22 for discussions on Twitter.

As I write in my foreword, we live in an age of extremes, also when it comes to some aspects of news and media use.

While many of the most commercially successful news media are doing well by primarily serving audiences that are, crudely put, like me – affluent, highly educated, privileged, in many countries predominantly male, middle-aged, and white – questions continue to mount around the connection between journalism and much of the public.

The purpose of our research at the Reuters Institute is to ensure that reporters, editors, and news media executives and others who care about the future of journalism can understand these trends and many others on the basis of reliable, robust, relevant research that can help inform how they – on the basis of their different ideals and interests – chose to adapt to a changing environment.

The Digital News Report is a key part of this.

Seven highlights from this year’s report below.

First, we find that a growing number of news media willing to embrace digital and able to offer distinct journalism in an incredibly competitive marketplace do well by doing good. But many struggle in an unforgiving winner-takes-most online environment, for example when it comes to subscriptions.

Second, while many commercially successful news media primarily serve audiences that are, crudely put, like me (affluent, highly educated, privileged etc) our findings document connection between journalism and much of the public is fraying. Interest and trust is down, news avoidance up.

Third, more broadly, in many countries much of the public question whether the news media are independent of undue political or government influence – even in very privileged countries, barely half say news media are independent of undue influence most of the time.

Fourth, these issues are compounded by differences in how new generations use media – looking specifically at those under 24 we find much less interest in connecting directly with news media, different views on what journalism ought to look like, much heavier reliance on newer forms of social media.

Fifth, across markets 54% say they worry about identifying the difference between what is real and fake on the internet when it comes to online news. More of those who say they mainly use social media as source of news (61%) are worried than among those who don’t use social at all (48%).

Sixth, despite these concerns, access to news continues to become more distributed. Across all markets, less than a quarter (23%) prefer to start their news journeys with a news site or app, down 9pp since 2018. Those aged 18–24 have an even weaker connection with news sites and apps.

Seventh, as publishers, but also individual journalists, seek to reach people via social media, it is important to note that, in most countries, half or more of respondents feel that journalists on social should stick to reporting the news on social media (even as a sizable minority feel they should be allowed to express personal opinions).

Report lead author is Nic Newman, working with Richard Fletcher, Craig T. Robertson, Kirsten Eddy, and myself.

It is made possible by 18 sponsors, our amazing country partners, and the whole Reuters Institute team.

It takes a village and I’m so happy to be part of this particular one.

New book out: “The Power of Platforms”

The Power of Platforms: Shaping Media and Society, my new book with Sarah Anne Ganter is out now with Oxford University Press.

Our core argument is that the power of platforms is deeply relational and based on ability to attract end users and partners like publishers.

It’s always hard to summarize extensive empirical work briefly, but here a few key points from my short Twitter thread on the book, with a few pics of some central passages in the book.

Platforms do not control the means of production, but the means of connection, and they are powerless without partners. To understand their power we need to understand both reservations partners have and why they often embrace platforms nonetheless, continue to work with them.

Platform power is an enabling, transformative, and productive form of power—and power nonetheless, tied to institutional and strategic interests of platform companies, often exercised in highly asymmetric ways.

It goes beyond hard and soft power. We identify five main aspects.

In the short run, actors make choices, in the long run, these choices become structures. Both platforms and partners have agency here, but there is a huge asymmetry between the biggest platforms (facing a few big platform rivals) and a multitude of much smaller publishers.

We approach platform power through an institutionalist lens, and focus on how it is exercised in relational ways through socio-technical systems that develop path-dependency and momentum over time and retain an imprint of their founding logics that shape ongoing interactions.

Our analysis is based on interviews across several countries, observation, background conversations, as well as on-the-record sources and more. In the methods appendix we reflect on individual and institutional positionality, including differences between the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism where I work and much of the research was done, and Simon Fraser University where Sarah now works.

The evolving relationships between platforms and publishers speaks to fundamental feature of the contemporary world – that not only individual citizens, but also social and political institutions, are becoming empowered by and dependent on a few private, for-profit companies

Very proud of the advance praise from colleagues with experiencing working in publishing companies, for platforms, as well as some leading academics researching digital media, including from Vivian Schiller, Nick Couldry, and José van Dijck. It means a lot to me personally to read what they kindly had to say about the book in advance of publication!

The research for this book was made possible by the prize money from the 2014 Tietgen Award, which funded Sarah’s position as a postdoctoral research fellow at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism and the associated research costs.

We would like to thank first of all our interviewees and everybody else who has talked to us, joined off-the-record discussions we hosted, invited us to events, and let us sit in on meetings. The book would not have been possible without them sharing their perspectives, and whether they agree with our analysis or not, we hope they recognize the processes they are part of in what we write about here.

In addition, many different colleagues and friends have provided generous (and often challenging!) feedback as we worked on this, including David Levy, the former Director of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, and our many good colleagues there. Special thanks go to Chris Anderson, Gina Neff, Joy Jenkins, and Lucas Graves, who went through an entire draft manuscript with us and provided invaluable input. Daniel Kreiss and the anonymous reviewer helped further sharpen our thinking, and the series editor Andrew Chadwick went above and beyond in helping us develop our ideas. Fay Clarke, Felix Simon, and Gemma Walsh all did an outstanding job as research assistants at various stages of the project. Angela Chnapko at Oxford University Press masterfully guided us through the publication process.

What academic work on journalism/news/media would it be useful for journalists to read?

Back in August, Meera Selva, Joy Jenkins and I — all from the Reuters Institute — started asking people for suggestions of what academic work on journalism/news/media it would be useful for journalists to read.

Bookshelf

We wanted to create a list of reading suggestions for the incoming Reuters Institute  Journalist Fellows, mid-career journalists from all over the world who spend between 3 and 9 months with us in Oxford working on a project of their own choosing

A stable version is on the institute website here, and a Google Document open to editing is here.

We also hoped this would be useful for journalists elsewhere thinking about the present and future of their profession, the institutions that sustain and constrain it, its social and political implications, and how it is changing.

I’ve often felt (and written about) that academic research on journalism is too disconnected and far removed from urgent, present conversations about the future of news, so it was great to be reminded that there are many in the academic community who care  about how research can play a role in these discussions, and enthusiastically offered up suggestions.

We had hundreds of suggestions — and I’m sure we could have collected or come up with hundreds more — so what we have done to make it  a bit more managable and easy to access is to create 17 topics with a few suggested readings, including one marked as a good place to start on that topic, and then collected the other suggestions at the back of the document.

The 17 topics, and suggested first readings, are

1. Some classic big ideas on journalism, media, and ideas in public life

* Lippmann, Walter. 1997. Public Opinion. New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A: Transaction Publishers.

2. What is journalism and news?

* Deuze, M. (2005). What is journalism? Professional identity and ideology of journalists reconsidered. Journalism, 6(4), 442-464. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884905056815

3. Audience behaviour

* Newman, Nic, Richard Fletcher, Antonis Kalogeropoulos, David A. L Levy, and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen. 2018. “Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2018.” Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/.

4. Trust and the news media

* O’Neill, Onora. 2002. A Question of Trust. Reith Lectures ; 2002. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Also available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2002/lectures.shtml)

5. Inequality and polarisation in news use

* Prior, Markus. 2005. “News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing Media Choice Widens Gaps in Political Knowledge and Turnout.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (3): 577–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00143.x.

6. Framing and media effects

* CommGap. 2012. “Media Effects”. World Bank Communication for Governance Accountability Program. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC/Resources/MediaEffectsweb.pdf (short overview).

7. Relations between reporters and officials

* Bennett, W. Lance. 1990. “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States.” The Journal of Communication 40 (2): 103–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1990.tb02265.x.

8. News, race, and recognition

* Lamont, M. (2018). Addressing recognition gaps: Destigmatization and the reduction of inequality. American Sociological Review, 83(3), 419-444. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0003122418773775

9. Women and journalism

* Franks, Suzanne. 2013. Women and Journalism. London: I.B.Tauris.

10. Business of news

* Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis. Forthcoming. “The Changing Economic Contexts of Journalism.” In Handbook of Journalism Studies, edited by Thomas Hanitzsch and Karin Wahl-Jorgensen. https://rasmuskleisnielsen.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/nielsen-the-changing-economic-contexts-of-journalism-v2.pdf.

11. Innovation in the media

* Küng, Lucy. 2015. Innovators in Digital News. RISJ Challenges. London: Tauris.

12. Platform companies and news media

* Bell, Emily J., Taylor Owen, Peter D. Brown, Codi Hauka, and Nushin Rashidian. 2017. “The Platform Press: How Silicon Valley Reengineered Journalism.” https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:15dv41ns27.

13. Digital media and technology

* Dijck, José van. 2013. The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

14. Disinformation

* Wardle, Claire, and Hossein Derakhshan. 2017. Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making. Report to the Council of Europe. https://shorensteincenter. org/information-disorder-framework-for-research-and-policymaking.

15. Democracy, journalism, and media

* Schudson, Michael. 2008. Why Democracies Need an Unlovable Press. Cambridge, UK: Polity. (Especially the chapter “Six or Seven Things that Journalism can do for Democracy”)

16. Censorship and propaganda

* Simon, Joel. 2014. The New Censorship : Inside the Global Battle for Media Freedom. Columbia Journalism Review Books. New York: Columbia University Press.

17. International/comparative research

* Hallin, Daniel C., and Paolo Mancini. 2005. “Comparing Media Systems.” In Mass Media and Society, edited by James Curran and Michael Gurevitch, 4th ed., 215–33. London: Hodder Arnold.

There are topics not yet on the list (local journalism, for example), and the list reflects the biases of published English language research and of our personal/professional  networks in tending towards studies of and from Western countries, often specifically from the US. (It also reflects the fact that I (a) have learned a lot from my time at Columbia University and (b) am proud of the work we have done at the Reuters Institute.) The list is thus, like any list, limited, but we hope it  is potentially useful and interesting, at least as a starting point, and hope journalists all over the world will find it useful.

Let us know what you think, we plan to update it going forward.

President Trump does not trust news from platform companies – nor do right-wing voters

President Trump not only considers wide swaths of the US news media “enemies of the people”.

He is now also asserting without evidence that social media companies like Facebook and Twitter “silence conservative voices” and has alleged that Google search results are “rigged” and are “suppressing” Republicans and conservatives.

Trump’s attacks included some demonstrable false claims, as for example BuzzFeed News has demonstrated, including the idea that Google promoted president Obama’s State of the Union on its homepage but stopped promoting these speeches when Trump took office.

As Jason Kint, CEO of Digital Content Next, a trade association that represents online news publishers and a frequent critic of platform companies wrote after Trump’s attacks on Google, “He’s 100% wrong. He’s spreading complete BS. If he was even remotely correct, I would be the first to call it out. I have a lot of issues with Google, this isn’t one of them.”

But will his attacks resonate with conservative voters? Our Reuters Institute Digital News Report survey data suggests it might.

Not only are partisan voters likely to take cues from politicians they support. In this case, the President’s attacks also plays into widespread distrust not only of news media, but also news found via social media and search engines. (Our survey was in the field in January/February so well before Trump started publicly attacking the platform companies.)

People on the political right in the US not only have far less trust in the news media than the rest of the population.

They also trust news in social and search far less than people in the center or on the political left, as shown in the chart below.

17 percent of those on the political right say they trust most news, compared to 16 percent who say they trust news in search engines and just 8 percent who say they trust news in social media. (The latter perhaps complicating the narrative that Conservatives favor social media.)

Trump trust US

Google has denied using political viewpoints to shape its search results, and said “Search is not used to set a political agenda and we don’t bias our results toward any political ideology.” (Facebook and Twitter have not responded directly.)

But Trump’s core supporters may not believe it, or any of the other platform companies the President is now attacking. As news media have long known, it is one issue how you can try to avoid political bias. It is another whether some people think you are politically biased.

Thanks to Antonis Kalogeropoulos who helped with the chart.

 

Trust in UK media

“The British people simply don’t trust the media”, Jeremy Corbyn said in his Alternative MacTaggart Lecture at the Edinburgh TV Festival. I spoke to BBC News for the News at Ten about trust in UK media, and below is a bit of Reuters Institute data for those interested.

RKN103ps

1) Trust in news is lower in the UK than many other countries,42 percent say they think they can trust “most news most of the time”, placing the UK 20th of the 37 countries we surveyed in 2018.

Trust

2) Corbyn also said that “most of our citizens think our newspapers churn out fake news day in, day out”, and indeed out survey data suggest that many online news users in the UK are also very or extremely concerned over what they see as “stories where facts are twisted to push an agenda” (55%) and “poor journalism” (51%). (Just as 44% are concerned over “the use of the term ‘fake news’ to discredit news media” by politicians and others).

concerns

3) But, while overall trust is low, and many are concerned that much of what they see is biased and shoddy, 54 percent say they trust the news they use, and at the brand level, most people find the BBC and other broadcasters, regional/local papers, and upmarket papers like the Times trustworthy — irrespective of whether they use them or not, whereas some digital-born sites and mid-market/popular newspapers have limited trust even from the people who use them.

brands

All this data and more from our 2018 Digital News Report by Nic Newman et al, available at for free download, interactive graphics etc.